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When "Legislature" May Mean More than
"Legislature": Initiated Electoral College
Reform and the Ghost of Bush v. Gore
by RICHARD L. HASEN*
Introduction
Imagine the following scenario, which, when I wrote the initial draft
of this article, was not at all far-fetched: Hillary Clinton is locked in a close
race with Rudolph Giuliani to become the forty-fourth President of the
United States. California Republicans raise funds to qualify a ballot
measure to appear on the November 2008 ballot that would change the
allocation of California's fifty-five Electoral College votes used to
determine the next President. Rather than using a statewide winner-take-all
system, which appoints all of the state's fifty-five electors to the winner of
the statewide popular vote, this initiative would change the method to
appoint two of the electors based on a statewide popular vote, and the
remaining electors based on the results of the popular vote for President in
each state congressional district.1 The measure is widely expected to help
Republicans capture as many as twenty Electoral College votes and could
well make the difference in the election nationally. Democrats file a pre-
election suit to keep the measure off the ballot arguing, among other things,
that the measure violates Article II of the United States Constitution, which
they claim allows only the state legislature, and not the people legislating
through the initiative process, to pick the rules for choosing presidential
electors.2 The California Supreme Court, citing precedent allowing it to
" William H. Harmon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks
to Vik Amar, Bob Bennett, Steven Mayer, Dennis Muller, Mark Scarberry and Rick Pildes for
useful comments and suggestions, Lisa Schultz for library assistance, and Alex Chen and John
Khosravi for research assistance.
1. See infra Part I.A.
2. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I ("Each state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress .... ").
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decline pre-election review of substantive constitutional claims,3 denies
review. The measure passes at the same time California voters vote for
President, and the fate of the presidency stands in the balance: Without a
portion of California's votes, Clinton wins and Giuliani cannot become
President. With twenty of California's electoral votes, Giuliani becomes
President.
The California Supreme Court rules on the legality of the initiative,
and the losing party files a petition for certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court, which for the second time in three elections, must decide a
case that will determine the outcome of the presidential election.4 The
identity of the forty-fourth President turns on a single legal question: Does
the reference to "Legislature" in Article II refer only to the state legislature
itself, or can it include the legislative power of the people to govern by
initiative, recognized in a state constitution? The results may depend upon
whether the conservatives on the Court will stick with a strict textual
reading of the term "Legislature" set forth in a concurring opinion in Bush
v. Gore5 to the detriment of Giuliani and upon whether the liberals on the
Court will abandon their skepticism of the textualist reading of
"Legislature" expressed in their Bush v. Gore dissents,6 to the detriment of
Clinton. The irony meter is off the charts.
Though the above scenario did not come to pass, a similar one could
face the courts in the near future. This Article examines the question of the
constitutionality of changes to the Electoral College accomplished through
the initiative process. However, this article does not discuss the merits of
either the Electoral College or reforms that have been proposed to change it
(whether through the initiative process or otherwise). Part I gives the brief
history of attempts to use the state initiative process to change the rules for
choosing presidential electors, beginning with Colorado's Amendment 36,
which failed to pass in the 2004 election, to the current California measure,
which failed to qualify for the ballot. It also explains that this issue could
well arise in a future election because of general dissatisfaction among
segments of the population with the Electoral College system for choosing
the President. Part II turns to the constitutional question whether initiated
changes to rules for choosing presidential electors violate Article II. It
offers an analysis of the question based upon the text of Article II, relevant
3. Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n v. McPherson, 136 P.3d 178, 183-84 (Cal. 2006). See
infra Part III.A.
4. The first such case, of course, was Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
5. See id. at 112-22 (Rehnquist, C.J.,joined by Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
6. See id. at 123-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 130-33 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at
141-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 147-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court case law involving Article II, as well as Articles I and V,
and the possible purposes behind Article II's use of the term "Legislature."
It concludes that the issue of the constitutionality of initiated Electoral
College reform is one about which reasonable jurists will differ, and
because of that difficulty resolution by the Supreme Court could appear
tainted by the political considerations, raising the specter of another Bush v.
Gore. Part III concludes with two strategies that can help avoid the Article
II question from becoming the next Bush v. Gore. First, courts should be
more willing to engage in pre-election review of such measures, so that
these issues can be resolved before, rather than after, an election. Second,
Congress should consider amending the Constitution with an election
administration amendment that would impose a two-year waiting period
before any state's changes to Electoral College rules may go into effect.
An amendment changing the Electoral College itself would be difficult to
pass through Congress and the states. But my proposal is a neutral
amendment ex ante that could decouple the consideration of the merits of
Electoral College reform from the short-term political advantages that
could come from such a change.
I. The Brief History of Initiated Electoral College Reform
A. 2004: Colorado's Amendment 36
The election of the United States President is hardly a straightforward
affair. Major party presidential candidates are chosen at presidential
conventions, whose delegates are chosen through primaries, conventions,
or caucuses conducted in each state.7 Each state has its own rules on who
may vote in party primaries, and these rules are subject to constitutional
objections by the political parties.8 Independent candidates may attempt to
bypass the nomination process and qualify state-by-state to appear on the
general election ballot for President. Each state sets its own rules for
independent candidacies, some of which have been struck down as too
onerous.
9
In the general election, presidential candidates compete for
presidential electors state-by-state. Each state is entitled to a number of
electoral votes equal to the number of its members of Congress in the
7. For an overview of the presidential primary process and the development of the direct
primary for choosing nominees of the major political parties, see ALAN WARE, THE AMERICAN
DIRECT PRIMARY: PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE NORTH
(Cambridge University Press 2002).
8. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
9. E.g. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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House of Representatives (which in turn is determined by the state's
population), plus one for each of the state's two U.S. Senators.' ° All but
two states provide that the plurality winner of a popular vote among
eligible voters in each state is entitled to all of that state's electoral votes.
Two states, Maine and Nebraska, currently provide that two of the state's
Electoral College votes go to the statewide plurality winner, with the
remainder allocated by the plurality winner of each congressional district."'
The states send their certified Electoral College votes to Congress, which
counts and certifies the votes. 12  A candidate obtaining a majority of
Electoral College votes becomes President. 13  In the event there is no
majority winner, the Constitution provides a convoluted procedure for the
House of Representatives to pick the President and for the Senate to choose
the Vice President.
14
Controversy over the merits of the Electoral College system for
choosing the U.S. President are not new15 and, over time, there have been
thousands of proposals for changing or even abolishing the Electoral
College system. 16 The most straightforward way to change to the Electoral
College system is through a constitutional amendment or through an
Article V constitutional convention. 17  But both of these routes for
amending the Constitution are exceedingly difficult: Constitutional
amendments require approval of a two-thirds vote of Congress and an
affirmative vote of three-quarters of the state legislatures. 18 Article V
10. U.S. CONST. art. II. For a more detailed overview of the procedure for choosing a
President, see GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA
1-30 (Yale University Press 2005).
11. ROBERT W. BENNETT, TAMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 43 (Stanford University
Press 2006).
12. Id. at 1.
13. U.S. CONST. amend XII.
14. Id. Professor Levinson calls the provisions in the Twelfth Amendment for resolving
elections in which no candidate has a majority of Electoral College votes "a national
constitutional crisis just waiting to happen." SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION (2006). The merits of these provisions are beyond the scope of this Article.
15. For a recent and thoughtful debate on the merits of the Electoral College among
Professors Sanford Levinson, John McGinnis, and Daniel Lowenstein, see Should We Dispense
with the Electoral College?, PENNUMBRA, http://pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=8.
16. Joy McAffee, Should the College Electors Finally Graduate? The Electoral College: An
American Compromise from Its Inception to Election 2000, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 643, 645 n.8
(2002).
17. See LEVINSON, supra note 14, ch. 6 (chapter entitled "The Impermeable Article V").
18. U.S. CONST. art. V. It should be noted, however, that despite political difficulties the
Seventeenth Amendment, providing for the direct election of Senators rather than their selection
through state legislatures, was accomplished by amendment. Levinson minimizes the
significance of the Seventeenth Amendment's passage to passage of future Amendments.
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conventions are even harder, requiring two-thirds of the state legislatures to
call the Convention and approval of the Convention's proposed
amendments by three-quarters of the state legislatures or three-quarters of
state conventions as Congress determines.' 9  And to the extent that
Electoral College reform could hurt some states, those states would have a
strong incentive to block, and relative ease in blocking such reforms, either
in Congress or in state legislatures.
For this reason, some Electoral College reformers recently have
preferred to move state-by-state. Some of these proposed reforms, as we
shall see, seek to make changes only within one state. Other proposed
reforms seek to impose a national change to the Electoral College system
through an agreement among the states as to the allocation of Electoral
College votes. 20 The most prominent of the current crop of proposals is the
National Popular Vote plan, which would have states agree to allocate all
of their electors to whoever was declared the winner of the popular vote for
President in the entire United States. The agreement would become
effective only when approved by states with a majority of the electors in
the Electoral College.a l
As far as I can tell, all of the changes to the means for allocating
Electoral College votes have been accomplished through actions of state
legislatures. Indeed, before 2004, it appears that no state ever even
considered the question of Electoral College reform through a voter
23initiative. In 2004, however, Colorado voters considered a voter
LEVINSON, supra note 14, at 161-62 (He says that its history does not "demonstrate that the
Constitution... is not an iron cage.").
19. U.S. CONST. art. V.
20. There remains a serious question about whether such end runs around the amendment
process would run afoul of the Constitution's "Compact Clause" in Article I, Section 10. For
competing analyses, see Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote
Compact, 6 ELECTION L.J. 372 (2007) and Jennifer S. Hendricks, Popular Election of the
President: Using or Abusing the Electoral College (Nov. 15, 2007) (unpublished draft), available
at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1030385. That question too is beyond the
scope of this Article.
21. For the detailed plan of the organization as well as legal analysis, see JOHN R. KOZA et
al., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL
POPULAR VOTE (2006), available at www.every-vote-equal.com, with additional information
about the National Popular Vote group at www.natonalpopularvote.com.
22. Maine adopted its change to partial allocation by congressional district in 1969. KOZA,
supra note 21, at 54. Maine's current rule is codified at ME. REV. ST. ANN. tit. 21-A § 802.
Nebraska enacted a similar change in 1992. See KOZA, supra note 21, at 54. Nebraska's is
currently codified at NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-7 10.
23. A search of M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC (2003)
reveals no initiative titles on the subject of Electoral College reform. In contrast to initiatives
directly changing the means for choosing electors, there have been initiatives proposed that would
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initiative, "Amendment 36," which would have changed the Colorado
Constitution to provide for allocation of the state's Electoral Votes
proportionally according to the results of the popular vote for President in
the state.24 Thus, a presidential candidate receiving seventy percent of the
state's popular votes for President would receive roughly seventy percent
of Colorado's electoral votes, and the candidate receiving thirty percent of
the popular votes would receive about thirty percent of the electoral votes.25
Amendment 36 was controversial when it was proposed, and it was
subject to legal challenge while voters considered it. Among the arguments
raised against it was that under Article II of the Constitution only a state
legislature may make changes in the rules for allocating presidential
electors.26 Opponents also argued that the measure, even if it passed, could
not go into effect for the 2004 election. 27 A federal district court refused to
rule on the merits of the legal arguments before the election,28 and the issue
have otherwise changed the nature of who may vote for president or how votes are cast or
counted. For example, Alaska voters considered, and rejected, a measure to use instant runoff
voting in a number of elections, including for the president. See Alaska Ballot Measure 1, August
2002, Section 4, available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/petitions/99prvt.htm;
Rachel D'Oro, Preferential Voting Suffers Sound Defeat, ALASKA DAILY NEWS, Aug. 28, 2002,
available at http://www.adn.com/front/story/1678169p-1794934c.html. But these measures
apparently have never been challenged on Article II grounds.
24. The text of the initiative, Amendment 36, Selection of Presidential Electors, is available
at http://www.lawanddemocracy.org/pdffiles/COamend36.pdf [hereafter "Amendment 36 Text"].
For additional background on the measure and the litigation, see David S. Wagner, The Forgotten
Avenue of Reform: The Role of States in Electoral College Reform and the Use of Ballot
Initiatives to Effect that Change, 25 REv. LITIG. 575 (2006).
25. The amendment provided detailed rounding rules to proportionally allocate Colorado's 9
electoral votes. See Amendment 36 Text, supra note 24.
26. See Complaint, Napolitano v. Davidson, No. 04-RB-2114, (D. Colo), para. 4i available
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/amend36complaint.pdf ("Plaintiff
maintains that Article II, § 1 of the United States Constitution requires that the Colorado
Legislature direct the manner of choosing presidential electors, that the Proposal prevents the
Colorado Legislature from doing so in the 2004 election, and, accordingly, that the Proposal is
unconstitutional in this regard.").
27. See Wagner, supra note 24, at 600.
28. See Kirk Johnson, Judge Allows Referendum on Dividing Colorado Electoral College
Vote, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/l0/26/politics/campaign/27electcnd.html?
hp&ex=1098849600&en=ac6e9l fd999e7728&ei=5094&partner=homepage. Napolitano, who
brought suit without a lawyer, did not appeal. Rick Hasen, Judge Dismisses Federal Lawsuit
Challenging Colorado's Amendment 36, ELECTION LAW BLOG, Oct. 26, 2004,
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/002205.html. It does not appear that the district court judge
issued a written ruling in dismissing Napolitano's claim, but instead incorporated his oral findings
of fact and conclusions of law into the final judgment.
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was mooted when voters rejected Amendment 36 by a vote of about sixty-
five percent against the measure to sixty-five percentin favor.
29
B. 2008: The California Electoral College Measure
The question of initiated Electoral College reform again emerged in
the 2008 election, this time in California. 30  A prominent California
Republican election lawyer, Tom Hiltachk, began circulating a ballot
measure31 which would have changed California's system for allocating the
state's 55 electoral votes from a winner-take-all system to a districting
system, along the lines of the Maine and Nebraska systems.3 The measure
was immediately attacked by some liberals as a Republican power grab;
Professor (and Maryland state senator) Jamin Raskin wrote that the "real
purpose [of the measure] is to break up the state's 55 electors, which
typically go to the Democrats in a bloc as inevitably as Texas, Georgia, and
Oklahoma give their 56 combined electors to the Republicans. Following
the proposed division of California's well-gerrymandered blue and red
congressional districts, it is likely that the 2008 GOP nominee under this
plan would carry away about 20 electors. In one fell swoop, this would
ruin the Democrats' chances for winning the presidency."
33
Hiltachk abandoned the effort to qualify the measure after some
controversy over the source for funding the qualification of the measure for
the ballot,34 but other Republicans continued the effort.35  Democrats
vowed to challenge the measure, including on grounds that it violates
29. See Official Publication of the Abstract of Votes Cast 2003-2004, COLORADO
SECRETARY OF STATE ELECTIONS CENTER, at 137-38, http://www.elections.colorado.gov/
V'.VW/default/Prior/o2OYears%20Eetion%20Information/2004/Abstract%202003%202004%2
0082305%20Late%20PM-5.pdf.
30. Earlier in the year, Democrats in the North Carolina Legislature attempted to make a
similar change in their state through the legislative process, only to be asked to abandon the effort
by the chairman of the National Democratic Committee. James Romoser, N.C., California in an
Electoral Juggle; Bids to Alter System May Favor Either Party, WINSTON-SALEM J., Aug. 17
2007, at Al.
31. The full text of the proposed ballot measure, No. 07-0032, is available at
http://ag.ca.gov/cms-pdfs/initiatives/2007-07-17_07-0032-Initiative.pdf.
32. See Hendrik Hertzberg, Votescam, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 6, 2007, at 21, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2007/08/06/070806taco talk-hertzberg.
33. Jamin Raskin, Deformed Reform: The Cure for the Electoral College is Worse Than
What Ails Us, SLATE, Aug. 24, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2172700/.
34. Carla Marinucci, Democrats Wants Feds to Investigate Electoral College Ballot Effort,
S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 2, 2007, at A4, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=-/c/a/2007/10/02/MND2SHTNQ.DTL&tsp=1.
35. See id.; Kevin Yamamura, Issa Boosts Electoral Measure, SAC. BEE, Nov. 1, 2007, at
A3, available at http://www.sacbee.com/111/story/465074.html.
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Article II of the Constitution.36 The challenge never materialized, because
the measure ultimately failed to qualify for the ballot, apparently because
of a lack of funds to collect enough signatures.37 Had the measure qualified
for the ballot, it was not clear whether the California Supreme Court would
have engaged in pre-election review, a point addressed in Part III A of this
Article.
C. The Future of Initiated Electoral College Reform
Even though the California measure failed to qualify for the ballot,
Electoral College reformers are likely to continue to look to the initiative
process as a potential avenue for Electoral College reform. Indeed,
proponents of the National Popular Vote plan devote considerable space in
their book to argue for the constitutionality of enacting their proposal via
the statewide initiative process 38 (though it appears that all of the action on
the plan thus far has taken place in state legislative chambers and not
through the initiative process). 39  Given the difficulties with formally
amending the U.S. Constitution, it is not at all surprising that proponents of
reform have looked in the direction of initiatives, which bypass both
Congress and state legislatures. If popular dissatisfaction40 and academic
36. Kevin Yamamura, Legal Challenge on Electoral Change, SAC. BEE, Nov. 2, 2007, at
A4, available at http://www.sacbee.com/lll/story/467322.html. If the measure would have
appeared on the November ballot and passed, it would have been vulnerable to challenge on
grounds that it could not have gone into effect until the 2012 presidential election because
initiative measures, unless they otherwise provide, go into effect the day after the election. CAL.
CONST. art. II, § 10a ("An initiative statute or referendum approved by a majority of votes
thereon takes effect the day after the election unless the measure provides otherwise."). This
question is beyond the scope of this Article.
37. Sacramento Bee Capitol Alert, Electoral College Measure Falls Short, Feb. 5, 2008,
http://www.sacbee.com/static/weblogs/capitolalertlatest/010429.html.
38. KOZA et al., supra note 21, at 291-337.
39. So far, Maryland is the only state to pass the National Popular Vote plan through
legislative enactment. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 8-5A-01 (1957). State legislatures in
California and Hawaii passed the measure, but the governor of each state vetoed the plan. Brian
Charlton, House Democrats Choose Not to Override Electoral College Veto, AP, May 4, 2007;
5/4/07 AP Alert - HI 05:02:53. Steve Lawrence, Senate OKs Giving State's Electoral College
Votes to Popular Vote Winner, AP, May 15, 2007, 5/15/07 AP Alert - CA 00:22:35. It is beyond
the scope of this Article whether Article II of the United States Constitution obviates the need for
state legislatures to obtain the signature of the governor to make Electoral College change
effective.
40. "Polls since the 1970s consistently show approximately 60 percent of Americans agree"
that the Electoral College should be abolished. LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT UNION: 23
PROPOSALS TO REVITALIZE OUR CONSTITUTION AND MAKE AMERICA A FAIRER COUNTRY
(2007).
[Vol. 35:4
dissatisfaction 41 with the Electoral College continues, expect to see more
Electoral College initiatives in the future, at least until the Supreme Court
rules on the Article II question.
II. The Constitutionality of Initiated Electoral College Reform
A. Introduction
The primary legal question over initiated Electoral College reform is
easily stated: Article II of the Constitution provides: "Each state shall
appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of
electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress ... Does vesting
power in each state's "Legislature" to set the manner of choosing
presidential electors mean that only the state legislature can choose such
rules, or does the term refer instead to the state's entire "legislative
process," including the initiative process in states that give the people the
power to legislate via direct initiative? If it means the former, which I will
refer to as the "Legislature means Legislature" theory of Article 11,
43
initiated Electoral College reform is unconstitutional. If it means the latter,
which I will refer to as the "Legislature as legislative process" theory of
Article II, then there is no Article II objection to initiated Electoral College
reform.
In a comment to New York Times columnist Bob Herbert, noted
constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe stated that the proposed
California Electoral College initiative,
clearly violates Article II of the Constitution, which very explicitly
requires that the electors for president be selected 'in such manner as
41. Among the recent academic books criticizing the current electoral college are BENNETT,
supra note 11; LEVINSON, supra note 14; EDWARDS, supra note 10. See also SABATO, supra
note 40, at 134-53 (arguing that we "mend," not "end" the Electoral College).
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added).
43. See C. Bryan Wilson, What's a Federalist to Do? The Impending Clash Between
Textualism and Federalism in State Congressional Redistricting Suits Under Article I, Section 4,
53 DUKE L.J. 1367, 1383 (2004) (discussing, in terms of Article I, Section 4, "The Literal
Meaning: 'Legislature' Means 'Legislature' and No Other State Entity."). The "Legislature
means Legislature" concept sometimes goes under the name "Independent State Legislature"
theory. See Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article 11 Independent State Legislature Doctrine,
29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 732 (2001). The "Independent" portion of the term refers to the right
of the state legislature to set rules for choosing electors unencumbered by other branches of state
government or other state-based constraints, such as state constitutions. In the context of the
dispute over initiated Electoral College reform, I believe the term "Legislature means
Legislature" theory is more intuitive than the term "Independent State Legislature."
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the Legislature' of the state directs .... In Mr. Tribe's view, the 'one
and only way' for California to change the manner in which its
electoral votes are apportioned is through an act of the State
Legislature.44
Professor Tribe's certitude is an eerie echo of Justice Stevens' dissent in
the 2000 Bush v. Gore case, in which the Justice stated the opposite
position, finding it "perfectly clear" that the term "Legislature" used in
Article II should be interpreted as parallel to its use in Article I, section 4-
which Justice Stevens read as consistent with the "Legislature as legislative
process" theory.45
As I will argue, the answer to the constitutional question is far from
clear in either direction. There is no case law directly on point, and the
remaining case law can be used to support either position. Even if one
moves beyond precedent to the possible purposes behind Article II-from
democratization/legislative filtration, to anti-partisan manipulation, to
preserving the national interest or promoting federalism-the issue is not
easily resolved. As Professor Pildes told Bob Herbert, "This is not an
open-and-shut case. 46
B. The Textualist Argument and Original Understanding
The strongest argument in favor of the "Legislature means
Legislature" theory is a purely textual one with great intuitive appeal.
Article II provides that each state "Legislature" gets to "direct" the
"manner" for choosing presidential electors. There seems little question
44. Bob Herbert, In 2008, Bush v. Gore Redux?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at A15,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/22/opinion/22herbert.html.
45. Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98, 123 n.1 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is perfectly clear
that the meaning of the words 'Manner' and 'Legislature' as used in Article II, § 1, parallels the
usage in Article I, § 4, rather than the language in Article V. Article I, § 4, and Article II, § 1,
both call upon legislatures to act in a lawmaking capacity whereas Article V simply calls on the
legislative body to deliberate upon a binary decision.") (citations omitted).
46. Herbert, supra note 44. Professor Amar initially took a middle position as well: "There
is a significant chance the current Court would continue to hold that Article II's specific reference
to state 'legislatures' insulates those legislatures from judicial oversight that otherwise would be
provided for under state law .... If that it so, it is at least arguable that the same could be said
about popular initiatives that override and thus displace the statutes the California legislature has
already passed in this area: These initiatives, too, might be seen by the Court as impermissibly
interfering with the legislature's complete discretion in this area." Vikram David Amar, The So-
Called Presidential Election Reform Act.: A Clear Abuse of California's Initiative Process,
FINDLAW, Aug. 17, 2007, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/amar/20070817.html. In his current piece in
this symposium, however, he has come to the view that "Article II should not be read to foreclose
(even ill-advised) initiative measures" reforming a state's system for allocating Electoral College
votes." See Vikram David Amar, Direct Democracy and Article II: Additional Thoughts on
Initiatives and Presidential Elections, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631 (2008).
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that the term "Legislature," used at the time of the ratification of the
Constitution (and today), meant (and means) the body of representatives
that passes laws in each state. 47  Applying this definition, the people of a
state, acting through the initiative process, may not "direct" the "manner"
of choosing presidential electors because the "people" are not the
"Legislature.
' 48
The drafting history of Article II is scant,4 9 though we do know that
the drafters put the power to choose the rules for presidential electors in the
hands of the state legislatures rather than mandating-as in the case of
choosing members of the House of Representatives 5°-the popular election
of the President.51 The initiative process did not exist in the states at the
time of the ratification of the United States Constitution at the end of the
eighteenth century52 and, unsurprisingly, I am aware of nothing in Article
II's drafting history suggesting the drafters or ratifiers considered the
question of the propriety of initiated Electoral College reform.
To some, the textualist argument may be enough to embrace the
"Legislature means Legislature" theory and to reject initiated Electoral
College reform as a violation of Article II. It appears that this instinct is
47. As the Supreme Court explained in Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920),
discussing the term in the context of the Constitution's Article V: "A Legislature was [at the time
of the ratification of the Constitution] the representative body which made the laws of the
people." The Supreme Court approved this language in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 365-66
(1931), an Article I, Section 4 case. See also id. ("Wherever the term 'legislature' is used in the
Constitution, it is necessary to consider the nature of the particular action in view.").
48. Professor Epstein appears to view this textualist interpretation of Article II as self-
evident: "Article II, Section I, Clause 2 reads like a strict liability provision. The Florida
legislature directs the manner in which presidential electors are appointed, and all other actors
within the Florida system have to stay within the confines of that directive." Richard A. Epstein,
"In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct": The Outcome in Bush v. Gore
Defended, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT 13, 20 (Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).
49. The most extensive discussion of Article II's drafting history that I have found appears
in Smith, supra note 43, at 743-64. See Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for
Bush v. Gore, in THE VOTE, supra note 48, at 99, 103 ("There is no relevant legislative history
explaining why the framers of the Constitution made [the departure from the 'usual principle of
federal constitutional law, which allows the people of each state to determine for themselves how
to allocate power among state governing institutions.']").
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.").
51. Smith, supra note 43, at 748-56.
52. WATERS, supra note 23, at 3, (reports that Thomas Jefferson proposed an initiative
process for Virginia in 1775 but it was not put in the Virginia Constitution).
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behind Professor Tribe's comment that the Constitution "very explicitly"
leaves the question in the hands of the legislature.
53
But textualist arguments do not always persuade even textualists,
especially in the face of case law and practice that has already added
nuance to the meaning, or even changed the plain meaning, of words. 4
Indeed, as we shall see, despite the apparent clarity of the meaning of the
term "Legislature," in some constitutional contexts the Supreme Court has
read the term "Legislature" more broadly to include the "legislative
process" of the state. These precedents could weigh heavily on Supreme
Court Justices who might have decided the issue differently were they
writing on a clean slate. Thus, I turn to the relevant precedents and policy
arguments on this question.
C. The Relevant Precedents under Article II, and under Articles I and V
1. Article H Precedent
As there is no direct Supreme Court precedent on the question of the
constitutionality of initiated Electoral College reform against an Article II
challenge, I turn to the closest cases on point, beginning with other Article
II cases.
Article II achieved something of national prominence during the 2000
election and the ensuing controversy over allocation of Florida's electoral
votes. This is not the place for a rehash of all the legal issues arising out of
that controversy." But the Supreme Court dealt with Article I in both of
the cases it heard arising out of the Florida controversy, and these decisions
may shed some light on the initiated Electoral College reform issue as well.
In the first of these cases, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board,56 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a decision
issued by the Florida Supreme Court concerning Democratic presidential
candidate Al Gore's request for a recount in four Florida counties. 7 The
53. Herbert, supra note 44 (quoting Professor Tribe).
54. Perhaps the best example comes in the area of the Eleventh Amendment, where Justice
Scalia, arguably the Justice on the current Supreme Court most committed to textualism, has
rejected the literal words of the Eleventh Amendment in favor of century-old precedent. See
Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Interpretive Issues in Semonole and Alden, 55 SMU L. REv. 377, 380
(2002).
55. For my own brief summary, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND
ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH v. GORE 42-46 (2003). For
a more extensive analysis, see ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE
TO THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY (2001).
56. Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
57. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 772 So,2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
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Florida Supreme Court reversed the Florida Secretary of State's decisions
regarding whether or not to include in electoral returns the results of some
of these recounts and to extend the time for some of the recounts.
The Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board was per curiam and rather cryptic. The Court noted:
As a general rule, this Court defers to a state court's interpretation of
a state statute. But in the case of a law enacted by a state legislature
applicable not only to elections to state offices, but also to the
selection of Presidential electors, the legislature is not acting solely
under the authority given it by the people of the State, but by virtue
of a direct grant of authority made under Article II, § 1, cl. 2, of the
United States Constitution.
5
The Court then quoted from an 1892 Supreme Court case, McPherson
v. Blacker,5 9 to the effect that the key words in Article II "operat[e] as a
limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the
legislative power, 60 to set the manner for choosing presidential electors.
The Supreme Court then stated that the Florida Supreme Court's decision
"may be read to indicate that it construed the Florida Election Code without
regard to the extent to which the Florida Constitution could, consistent with
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, 'circumscribe the legislative power.' 61  The Court
remanded the case "for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion ' 6
2
for the lower court to explain "the extent to which [it] saw the Florida
Constitution as circumscribing the legislature's authority under Article II, §
1, cl. 2. ' 6
Stripped of the obtuse language, the point of the Supreme Court's first
Florida case appeared to be this: Article II of the Constitution vests
"authority" for setting the manner of choosing presidential electors in the
hands of the legislature. In McPherson, the Supreme Court wrote that
Article II prevents the state from "circumscrib[ing] the legislative power"
to set those rules. This principle might apply even to limits on legislative
58. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76.
59. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892).
60. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76 (quoting McPherson, 146
U.S. at 25).
61. Id. at 77. The Court also noted that it was unclear the extent to which the Court
considered the effect of a federal statute, 3 U.S.C. § 5, regarding a "safe harbor" preventing
Congressional challenge to a state's Electoral College votes submitted within a certain period of
time. Id. at 77-78. This point is irrelevant to the Article II analysis in the text.
62. Id. at 78.
63. Id. The Court also directed the Florida Supreme Court on remand to explain "the
consideration the Florida Supreme Court accorded to 3 U.S.C. § 5." Id.
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power contained in the state's own constitution. Because it was unclear
whether the Florida Supreme Court read the Florida constitution's right to
vote as trumping the Florida state legislature's rules for choosing
presidential electors, remand was in order.64
Eight days after the Supreme Court decided Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board, it decided a second case arising from the
Florida controversy. Al Gore, by this point, had contested the results of the
election and asked for additional manual recounts of votes in certain
Florida counties. A Florida trial court judge denied the request for
recounts, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, ordering a statewide
recount of all the undervotes cast in the state in the presidential election,
along with other relief.65 The Florida Supreme Court ruling depended upon
several controversial interpretations of Florida's election statutes, and it
drew a blistering dissent from the chief justice of that court.66
As is well known, in Bush v. Gore67 the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote,
reversed the Florida Supreme Court, ending the recount process and
leading to the selection of George W. Bush over Al Gore as President. A
per curiam opinion for five Justices held that the recounts ordered by the
Florida Supreme Court failed to comply with the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and that a remand for
recounts under acceptable standards was inappropriate (with the result
being that Florida's votes would be certified for candidate Bush and he
would be declared President).68 Four Justices rejected the per curiam
69
opinion.
Three of the five Justices signing on to the majority opinion-Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas-wrote separately as
well to argue that the Florida Supreme Court's opinion violated Article II.
Whereas the Article II issue in the first Florida case concerned the question
whether the state constitution was improperly trumping the state
legislature's wishes as to the manner of choosing electors, the question in
the second Florida case concerned whether the Florida Supreme Court
64. On remand, the Florida Supreme Court reached the same decision, this time without
relying on the state Constitution. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, 772 So.2d
1273 (Fla. 2000).
65. Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243, 1247 (2000).
66. Id. at 1262-70 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
67. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
68. Id. at 110-11.
69. Two of the Justices in dissent, Justices Breyer and Souter agreed there were
constitutional problems with the Florida Supreme Court order, but rejected the majority's
decision to end the recounts. The other two Justices, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, rejected the
equal protection argument in toto.
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itself was improperly trumping the state legislature's wishes as to the
manner of choosing electors.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that under Article II,
[T]he general coherence of the legislative scheme [for the appointing
of Florida's 25 electors] may not be altered by judicial interpretation
so as to wholly change the statutorily provided apportionment of
responsibility among these various bodies .... What we would do
in the present case is... hold that the Florida Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Florida election laws impermissibly distorted
them beyond what a fair reading required, in violation of Article I1.70
In other words, in the view of the concurring Justices, the Florida Supreme
Court's interpretation of Florida statutes governing election contests so
mangled Florida's legislatively-created statutes as to create "new law" for
choosing presidential electors in violation of Article II.
The four Bush v. Gore dissenters took great issue with the view of
Article II expressed in Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence. Justice
Stevens wrote that "nothing in Article II of the Constitution frees the state
legislature from the constraints in the State Constitution that created it.
Moreover, the Florida Legislature's own decision to employ a unitary code
for all elections indicated that it intended the Florida Supreme Court to play
the same role in Presidential elections that it has historically played in
resolving electoral disputes."'71 He added that "[i]t is perfectly clear that
the meaning of the words 'Manner' and 'Legislature' as used in Article II,
§ 1, parallels the usage in Article I, § 4, rather than the language in Article
V. Article I, § 4, and Article II, § 1, both call upon legislatures to act in a
lawmaking capacity whereas Article V simply calls on the legislative body
to deliberate upon a binary decision.
' 72
70. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 114-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
71. Id. at 124 (Stevens J., joined by Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Souter
wrote that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation was not "unreasonable to the point of
displacing the legislative enactment" in violation of Article II. Id. at 131. Justice Ginsburg wrote
that "[b]y holding that Article II requires our revision of a state court's construction of state laws
in order to protect one organ of the State from another, THE CHIEF JUSTICE contradicts the
basic principle that a State may organize itself as it sees fit." Id. at 141 (Ginsburg J., joined by
Stevens, J., Souter, J. and Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote that "neither the text of
Article II itself nor the only case the concurrence cites that interprets Article II, McPherson v.
Blacker [], leads to the conclusion that Article II grants unlimited power to the legislature, devoid
of any state constitutional limitations, to select the manner of pointing electors. . . Nor, as Justice
Stevens points out, have we interpreted the federal constitutional provision most analogous to Art.
II, § 1-Art. I, § 4-in the strained manner put forth in the concurrence." Id. at 148 (Breyer, J.,
joined by Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., and Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 124 n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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What do these two cases tell us about the Supreme Court's
understanding of Article II in relation to the question of the
constitutionality of initiated Electoral College reform under Article II?
Very little. It is possible to read Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board as supporting the "Legislature means Legislature" theory of Article
II. After all, the case cited McPherson v. Blacker for language suggesting
that no organ of state power-presumably from a state constitution to the
state judiciary to the people acting through the initiative process-may
"circumscribe the legislative power" to set the manner for choosing
presidential electors. That reading is consistent with a strict textualist
reading of the clause.
But a closer look at Palm Beach County Canvassing Board shows that
it did not actually endorse this language from McPherson. The Court first
described McPherson as "not address[ing] the same question petitioner
raises here., 73 It then quoted McPherson without necessarily endorsing it.
It concluded without any statement that the legislature's Article II power is
plenary and exclusive in determining the rules for choosing presidential
electors. Instead, after quoting from McPherson, the Supreme Court in
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board simply remanded the case to the
Florida Supreme Court for clarification of the basis for the lower court's
ruling, without committing itself to striking down the lower court's decision
even if it determined that the lower court ruling was based upon a holding
that the Florida state constitution trumped the Florida legislature's statutes
governing the presidential election process.
This reading of Palm Beach County Canvassing Board is consistent
with the posture and politics of the case. There was undoubtedly pressure
both inside and outside the Supreme Court to issue a unanimous opinion in
the Florida cases to show that the Supreme Court as an institution stood
above politics. To reach such a unanimous opinion, however, the Court
had to craft an opinion that would satisfy divergent views of the
constitutional question. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board is more of
a punt than an opinion; by remanding, it bought time for the issue to
resolve itself some other way. It is not strong authority for the "Legislature
means Legislature" theory of Article II.
Further support for the argument that Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board decided nothing on the Article II question comes from the Court's
decision issued only eight days later in Bush v. Gore. Though Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board was unanimous, in Bush v. Gore the Court
divided bitterly on the meaning of Article II and the appropriate reading of
73. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76.
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McPherson. Three Justices read McPherson and Article II as supporting
the "Legislature as Legislature" theory of Article II; four Justices strongly
reject this reading in favor of the "Legislature as legislative process"
reading of Article II; and two Justices, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, did
not express an opinion on the issue at all.7 4
Thus, a fair reading of both Florida cases is that there is not a majority
opinion on the meaning and proper scope of Article II. Moreover, even if
there were a majority on the questions presented in the Florida cases-
whether a state constitution or the state judiciary may trump a state
legislature's rules for choosing presidential electors-that decision does not
necessarily answer the question whether the people using the initiative
process can trump an earlier legislatively-enacted set of rules.
Nor does it appear that the 1872 case of McPherson v. Blacker, which
figured so prominently in the two Florida cases, answers the question of the
proper reading of Article II. In McPherson, the Supreme Court rejected a
complaint that the decision of the Michigan legislature to use electoral
districts for the allocation of presidential electors violated Article II. There
seems little question on the merits that a state legislature has such power
under Article II, and therefore any statements about whether Article II
limits state constitutions, courts, or the people is unnecessary to the
decision and therefore obiter dicta. Moreover, what the McPherson Court
did say on that score was contradictory. On the one hand, the McPherson
Court wrote that Article II prevents the state from circumscribing
legislative power.75 It also stated that Article II leaves the selection of the
manner for choosing presidential electors "exclusively" to the
legislatures.76 On the other hand, McPherson implicitly rejects the
"Legislature means Legislature" theory by stating that "[t]he Legislative
power is the supreme authority except as limited by the constitution of the
74. Professor Amar states that Chief Justice Rehnquist's Bush v. Gore concurrence "likely had the
tacit support of Justice's O'Connor and Kennedy, as well." Amar, supra note 46. I am not sure why
Professor Amar draws this conclusion. If anything, the opposite appears to be the case. Many people
have speculated that the Rehnquist concurrence was originally to be the majority opinion of the Court,
and that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, uncomfortable with the Rehnquist approach, drafted the per
curiam opinion. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Bush v. Gore: A Special Report; Election Case a Test
and Trauma for Justices, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2001) at Al, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res-9A03EED71F30F933A15751COA9679C8B63
("although intended as a majority opinion, the chiefjustice's opinion failed to get the support of Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor. They drafted their own opinion, concluding that the standardless recount
violated the guarantee of equal protection").
75. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892).
76. Id. at 27.
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State.,7 7 Zipkin, noting the conflicting dicta, concludes quite correctly that
McPherson "is a very weak foundation for an important decision on
constitutional law; the plaintiffs claim was patently unsound and anything
the Court would have said beyond its rejection would be extraneous. 78
One other set of Article II cases merits a brief mention before turning
to cases under other provisions of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly upheld congressional power to regulate federal elections,
despite the fact that by its own express terms Article II gives Congress no
more than the power to set the time for the choosing of presidential
electors.79 While these precedents by no means speak directly to the
question of the propriety of initiated Electoral College reform, they do
represent a rejection of a narrow textualist approach to the meaning of
Article II. Even Justice Scalia, a committed textualist, has rejected a
narrow textualist reading of Article II in the context of the question of
Congressional power to regulate presidential elections, at least to some
extent.8°
2. The Article I, Section 4, and Article V Cases
Faced with the lack of any definitive precedent in the Article II area,
we might look fruitfully to interpretation of two other Constitutional
provisions that require understanding the meaning of the term
77. Id. at 25; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting this language from McPherson). McPherson further provides that "the sovereignty of
the people is exercised through their representatives in the legislature, unless by fundamental law
power is elsewhere reposed." McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added). This language of
course suggests power could be reposed in the people themselves, through devices of direct
democracy.
78. Saul Zipkin, Note, Judicial Redistricting and the Article I State Legislature, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 350, 362-63 (2003). Both Zipkin, id. at 358-64, and Smith, supra note 43, 764-
83, trace the history of the "Legislature means Legislature" reading of Article II in some state
supreme court cases which did not reach the United States Supreme Court.
79. In Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934), the Court held that Congress
had the power under Article II to regulate corrupt practices that could affect presidential elections.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 3 (1976), the Court upheld Congress's power to regulate
campaign financing in both congressional and presidential elections. And in Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Court upheld Congress's power to change the voting age for president to
18. Justice Black cast the decisive vote on the issue, concluding that "[i]t cannot be seriously
contended that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential elections than it has over
congressional elections." Id. at 124 (opn. of Black, J.). I recently cited these cases in testimony
before the Senate Rules and Administration Committee on the likely constitutionality of a
proposed federal statute that would set the dates for a regional presidential primary system. See
Regional Presidential and Primary Caucus Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1905 Before United States
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Richard L.
Hasen), available at http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2007/HasenTestimony091907.pdf.
80. Antonin Scalia, The Legal Framework for Reform, 4 COMMONSENSE 40, 47 (1981).
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"Legislature." Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof, but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Place of chusing Senators. 81  Article V
requires ratification of constitutional amendment "by Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States. 'S Unfortunately, from the point of view of
clarity, the term "Legislature" has been interpreted in contradictory ways in
these two constitutional provisions.
The two leading cases in the Article I, section 4 context support the
"Legislature as legislative process" reading of the Constitution. In Ohio ex
rel. Davis v. Hildebrant,83 the Ohio Constitution had been amended to
provide that legislative power was vested not only in the state legislature,
but also "in the people, in whom a right was reserved by way of
referendum to approve or disapprove by popular vote any law enacted by
the general assembly." 84 The Ohio general assembly passed a redistricting
act for congressional elections, and enough electors petitioned for the
measure to be subject to voter approval through a referendum. Voters
rejected the redistricting act in a referendum. The Supreme Court
considered whether, under Article I, Section 4, the results of the
referendum affected the validity of the redistricting measure passed by the
Ohio general assembly. Rejecting the "Legislature as Legislature" theory
in this context, the Supreme Court held that "the referendum constituted a
part of the state Constitution and laws; and was contained within the
legislative power; and therefore the claim that the law which was
disapproved and was no law under the Constitution and laws of the state
was yet valid and operative is conclusively established to be wanting in
merit., 85 The Court also suggested that any further challenge to the use of
the referendum power (such as by claiming it violated the constitutional
guarantee of a republican form of government) was a nonjusticable
political question best addressed by Congress.86
Similarly, in Smiley v. Holm,87 the two houses of the Minnesota state
legislature passed a bill dividing the state into nine new congressional
districts following a decennial census. The governor returned the bill
81. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4 (emphasis added).
82. Id., art. V (emphasis added).
83. Ohio ex rel Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
84. Id. at 566.
85. Id. at 568.
86. Id. at 569.
87. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
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without his approval. The Minnesota legislature took the position that
under Article I, Section 4, the governor's approval was not necessary for
the redistricting measure to go into effect. The Supreme Court disagreed,
ruling that in the absence of a contrary intent, "the exercise of the authority
[to regulate congressional elections] must be in accordance with the
method which the state has prescribed for legislative enactments. 88
Because normal laws in Minnesota were subject to gubernatorial veto, the
redistricting measure returned by the governor could not be effective.89
These cases remain good law today under Article I, section 4, and lend
some support to the initiated Electoral College reform power. To the extent
there is reason to read the term "Legislature" in Article I, section 4 parallel
to its use in Article 1I, Smiley and Hildebrant stand for the proposition that
"Legislature" can mean "legislative power" and not just the actual state
legislature. It should be noted, however, that in both Smiley and Hildebrant
the state legislature still retained some role in the choice of congressional
districting. Laws passed by the initiative process would completely
exclude the legislature from that process (or the analogous process of
selecting the manner of choosing presidential electors under Article II). So
it would be possible to (1) accept the analogy between Article II and
Article I, Section 4 and (2) accept Smiley and Hildebrant as good law, (3)
but still hold that initiated Electoral College reform violates Article II
because it leaves no role for the state legislature. 90
One recent Article I, section 4 case deserves mention. In Colorado
General Assembly v. Salazar,9 1 the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a
case involving a Colorado Supreme Court decision on Congressional
redistricting. The Colorado Supreme Court had held that under the
Colorado constitution, there could be only one redistricting conducted per
decade. A court had ordered redistricting earlier in the decade when the
Colorado legislature failed to pass a redistricting plan, and in Salazar the
Colorado Supreme Court held that the earlier, judicially-mandated
88. Id. at 367.
89. Smiley, 285 U.S. at 372-73.
90. Indeed, Justice Stevens, speaking only for himself, has suggested that under Article I,
section 4, initiated changes to the manner of conducting Congressional elections that are not
changeable by the state legislature may be unconstitutional. See California Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The text of [Article I, section 4] suggests that
such an initiative system, in which popular choices regarding the manner of state elections are
unreviewable by independent legislative action, may not be a valid method of exercising the
power that the Clause vests in state 'Legislature[s]."'); see also Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 517,
526 n.20 (2001) (refusing to reach question whether initiative requiring disclosure of
congressional candidate's views on term limits violated Article I, section 4).
91. Colorado General Assembly v. Salazar, 541 U.S. 1093 (2004).
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districting prohibited the state legislature from redistricting again until the
next decade. The Colorado General Assembly and Secretary of State
argued that the Colorado Supreme Court's construction of the Colorado
Constitution violated Article I, Section 4-paralleling the argument about
the Florida Supreme Court usurping the Florida legislature's Article II
power in Bush v. Gore. The same three Justices advancing the Article II
theory in a concurrence in Bush v. Gore-Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Scalia and Thomas-dissented from the denial of certiorari in
Salazar on similar grounds. "[T]o be consistent with Article I, § 4, there
must be some limit on the State's ability to define lawmaking by excluding
the legislature itself in favor of the courts. 92 Though the statement seems
to support the "Legislature means Legislature" theory, the dissenters
distinguished Smiley and Hildebrant in a way that could actually support
the constitutionality of initiated Electoral College reform: "Conspicuously
absent from the Colorado lawmaking regime, under the Supreme Court of
Colorado's construction of the Colorado Constitution to include state-court
orders as part of the lawmaking, is participation in the process by a body
representing the people, or the people themselves in a referendum." 93 The
denial of a writ of certiorari is not a ruling on the merits, so we should be
careful not to read too much into the fact that only three Justices advanced
some version of the "Legislature means Legislature" theory in the Article I,
section 4 context.
Though the leading Article I, section 4 cases endorse the "Legislature
as legislative process" theory, on the other side of this divide are Article V
cases. In Hawke v. Smith,94 the Supreme Court considered the propriety of
an Ohio constitutional provision reserving the right of voters to adopt or
reject at the polls a decision by the state legislature to ratify an amendment
to the United States Constitution. Article V of the U.S. Constitution
requires ratification by "the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several
states. 95  And in Hawke the Supreme Court held that the term
"Legislature" in this context meant the actual state legislature, and not the
"Legislature as legislative power."
The Court held the error with the "Legislature as legislative power"
theory of Article V is that it rested on the "fallacious" idea that ratification
of a constitutional amendment was an act of legislation. Instead,
ratification "is but the expression of the assent of the State to a proposed
92. Salazar, 541 U.S. at 1095 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
95. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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amendment. 96 The Court further endorsed an administrative rationale for
the rule that only the state legislature plays a role in ratification of
amendments to the U.S. Constitution: "Any other view might lead to
endless confusion in the manner of ratification of federal amendments."
97
Finally, the Hawke Court distinguished its decision in Hildebrant on
two grounds. First, Congress itself had recognized the power of states to
approve referenda concerning redistricting matters, and Article I, Section 4
(unlike Article II) gives Congress the power to choose rules for
congressional elections that trump state rules.98 Second, the Hawke Court
contrasted the nature of the action of a state legislature in setting rules for
Congressional elections under its Article I, Section 4 power compared to its
ratification of constitutional amendments under its Article V power: "Such
legislative action [in the Article I, Section 4 context] is entirely different
from the requirement of the Constitution as to the expression of assent or
dissent to a proposed amendment to the Constitution. In such expression
no legislative action is authorized or required." 99 As Zipkin puts it, in the
Article V context, "the state has no power to define its legislature as it
chooses when the legislature is co-opted to perform a federal task."' 00
Taken together, these cases provide a reasonable amount of support
for the "Legislature as legislative power" theory of Article II, which would
allow for initiated Electoral College reform. The Court in its Article I,
Section 4 cases has endorsed this theory, and it appears that Article II
legislating the rules for choosing presidential electors is more like Article I,
Section 4 legislating the rules for congressional elections than like Article
V ratification of constitutional amendments. In both the Article I, Section
4 and Article II contexts, the Constitution contemplates "legislative
action," ° which may extend beyond the pure actions of the legislature to
other organs of state power. In the Article V context, in contrast, there is
simply the question of legislative "assent or dissent. 10 2 As Justice Stevens
put it in his dissent in Bush v. Gore, "Article I, § 4, and Article II, § 1, both
call upon legislatures to act in a lawmaking capacity whereas Article V
96. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 229.
97. Id. at 230.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 231.
100. Zipkin, supra note 78, at 373; see also Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922)
("[T]he function of a state legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to the Federal
Constitution, like the function of Congress in proposing the amendment, is a federal function
derived from the Federal Constitution; and it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by
the people of a State.").
101. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 229.
102. Id. at 231.
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simply calls on the legislative body to deliberate upon a binary decision." 10 3
On the other hand, Article II gives more power to the state legislature than
Article I, Section 4. The former gives the state legislature the power to
choose electors directly; the latter gives the state legislature only the
manner for running congressional elections (subject, of course, to
congressional override, absent in Article II).
The case for the Article I, Section 4 analogy is not ironclad, especially
given the force of the contrary textualist argument and the strong contrary
views in the two recent Florida decisions, which could weigh heavily on
the Supreme Court if the issue comes before it. Whether the similarities
between the two sections of the Constitution would be enough for the
Supreme Court to uphold initiated Electoral College reform as consistent
with Article I-especially given the fact that such reform cuts the state
legislature completely out of the process of setting the manner for choosing
presidential electors, remains to be seen. 10 4 Given this uncertainty, I turn
finally to policy-based arguments supporting the two alternative theories of
Article II.
D. A Purposivist/Policymaking Approach to Article II's Use of the Term
"Legislature"
Faced with a textualist argument pointing in one direction on the
meaning of Article II and a case law analysis pointing, at least moderately,
in the other direction, it is fruitful to turn to policy arguments that might
break the tie over whether initiated Electoral College reform violates
Article II. Here, I consider three potential clusters of theories about the
purpose of Article II-democratization/filtration, anti-manipulation, and
national interest/federalism-and consider whether initiated Electoral
College reform is consistent with, or in opposition to those purposes.
Unfortunately, these theories too point in conflicting directions.
103. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 n.1 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Wagner,
supra note 24, at 599 ("given the strong viewpoints of the four dissenters in Bush v. Gore, as well
as the appeal of a structural argument highlighting the similarities between Article I, Section 4
and Article II, Section 1, the better answer is to regard ballot initiatives as a constitutional
exercise of a state's legislative power under Article II, Section 1.").
104. The issue could become even more complicated if a state legislature acted after initiated
Electoral College reform passes in a state to reverse the initiated reform. Even if state law would
ordinarily prevent the state legislature from overruling an initiative unless the initiative so
provides (see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10), perhaps Article II of the U.S. Constitution would
give the state legislature the power to do so.
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1. Democratization/Filtration
Judge McConnell, writing in the context of Bush v. Gore, gives "two
apparent functional justifications"'10 5 for the provision. His first is a theory
of democratization:
[Article II] ensures that the manner of selecting electors will be
chosen by the most democratic branch of the state government. The
election of presidential electors need not be directly democratic; the
legislature could select the electors itself, or even delegate authority
to a more limited body... . But by vesting the authority to choose
the mode of selection in the most democratic branch, the framers
gave that decision a democratic bias.' 0 6
Judge McConnell offered this theory in favor of the concurring
opinion's approach in Bush v. Gore finding that the state supreme court had
usurped the power of the state legislature to choose presidential electors:
Certainly legislatures are more "democratic" than the courts and perhaps
more democratic than the executive branch. But arguably the initiative
process is even more "democratic" than the state legislature, in that the
people themselves, rather than their representatives, get to choose the rules.
Indeed, the initiative process is particularly valuable when it can be used
for election law reform that might not otherwise take place because of the
self-interest of legislators.0 7 If the purpose of Article II is democratization,
then initiated Electoral College reform should be constitutional, even
encouraged.
However, to the extent one cares about the framers' intent, there is
reason to doubt the premise of the argument that Article II's purpose is
democratization. What we know from Article II's scant legislative history
is that at least some of the Constitution's drafters favored giving control
over the rules of choosing presidential electors in the hands of state
legislatures rather than, as in the case of choosing members of Congress,
directly in the hands of the people. 108
105. McConnell, supra note 48, at 103.
106. Id.,at 103-04.
107. Even some opponents of the initiative process have recognized the point. See Richard L.
Hasen, Comments on Baker, Clark, and Direct Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUEs 563, 564
(2004).
108. See Smith, supra note 43, at 752-53 (explaining that Elbridge Gerry favored legislative
appointment to protect state interests and to "filter the popular will through an intermediate
body.").
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Though this history is far from clear, and some of the ratifiers likely
believed Article II gave the power to choose electors to the people, 1 9 in the
end the framers of Article II made a less democratic choice than direct
election of the president by the people. Indeed, it is just as plausible to
reject the democratization theory in favor of a filtration one. The framers
put the power in the hands of legislatures to lessen the amount of the direct
influence of the people. Legislatures act as agents for filtering popular
will, and provide various means by which those with intense feelings can
block controversial legislation. Allowing Electoral College reform through
the initiative process eliminates the legislative filtration function. Thus, if
we read Article II's true purpose as filtration rather than democratization,
initiated Electoral College reform should be rejected.
2. Anti-manipulation
Judge McConnell offers a second rationale for Article II:
[L]egislatures, in contrast to courts and executive officials, must
enact their rules in advance of any particular controversy. A
legislative code is enacted behind a veil of ignorance; no one knows
(for sure) which rules will benefit which candidates .... To be sure,
this veil of ignorance is only partially opaque: it is sometimes
possible to make an educated guess about the probable partisan
consequences of particular electoral rules. For example, favorable
rules for recognizing absentee ballots from abroad could be expected
to benefit Republicans, and easy registration of voters could be
expected to benefit Democrats. Partisan calculation therefore can
play a role. By requiring the manner of selection of electors to be
specified in advance by the legislature, however, the Constitution
limits the ability of political actors to rig the rules in favor of their
candidate. "1
0
The anti-manipulation rationale, as offered by Judge McConnell,
moderately supports the constitutionality of initiated Electoral College
reform. Initiatives, like statutes passed by legislatures, must be written in
advance. Indeed, given the lead time necessary to write an initiative, obtain
a title and summary from a government agency, collect signatures, and
have those signatures verified, the lead time on initiatives is much longer
than legislation. Presumably there are some rules for choosing presidential
electors that a legislature can choose up to the last minute (or even beyond,
109. Smith ultimately concludes that even at the time of ratification of the Constitution,
"Article II, Section 1 meant different things to different people; some would have state
legislatures choose electors, while others would have the people do it." Id. at 757.
110. McConnell, supra note 48, at 103-04.
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as we shall see); that is not true with an initiative. If anything, initiatives
should be preferred to legislative enactments on anti-manipulation grounds.
There are two potential problems with the anti-manipulation rationale,
however. First, to the extent one cares about original intent, there is
nothing I am aware of that indicates anti-manipulation as a basis for the
framers' decision in Article II's language vesting the power for choosing
electors in the hands of the state legislature. Indeed, Judge McConnell
appears to have generated the rationale not from history but upon
considering the facts of the Florida controversy: He was reacting to what he
saw as post-election judicial rule changes for choosing presidential
electors.
Second, and more importantly, though there is much to be said for
setting the rules of the game in advance to prevent partisan manipulation of
the process, 1 ' Article II is not a very good tool for preventing such
manipulation. Indeed, the very essence of the political case against the
recent California initiative is that it is just such a partisan manipulation:
Republicans proposed it to help the Republican presidential candidate by
capturing a portion of the very large set of California electoral votes.
Legislatures can play this game too: It is worth recalling that during the
Florida controversy, the Florida legislature, dominated by Republicans,
stood ready post-election to choose an alternative Republican slate of
electors should the Florida courts have declared Gore the winner of the
state's electoral votes." 2 Indeed, the winner-take-all strategy for awarding
electoral votes was pushed in Virginia soon after ratification of the
Constitution as a means to favor Thomas Jefferson's election as
President." 3 Thus, it is difficult to read an anti-manipulation intent into
Article II given how little Article II (under either theory) does to prevent
such manipulation.
3. National Interest/Federalism
There is no question that there is a unique federal interest at stake in
the selection of the President." 4 Indeed, this policy preference underlies
Judge Posner's defense of the result in Bush v. Gore as a means of avoiding
111. See infra Part III.B.
112. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, in THE VOTE, supra note 48, at 204, 217
("Almost certainly [if the counting went beyond December 12, 2000], the Republican-dominated
Florida legislature would have promptly sent a slate of electors, thus producing two (identical)
slates for Bush ... ").
113. Bennett, supra note 11, at 43.
114. Cf. Zipkin, supra note 80, at 375-76 (suggesting in context of Articles I and II there is
not a "significant federal interest" in assuring that the state legislature plays a substantive federal
role).
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a potential "constitutional crisis" which would have resulted had Congress
been forced to choose between conflicting slates of Florida presidential
electors." 15 Moreover, it provides a strong reason why the Florida courts in
2000 should not have ordered a "revote" in Palm Beach County despite
very strong evidence that the poorly designed "butterfly ballot" caused
many voters to mistakenly cast a vote for a different presidential candidate
than the one they preferred."
6
If it could be shown that the use of the initiative process makes it more
likely that the outcome of presidential elections would be in dispute
compared to legislatively-set rules for choosing presidential electors, then
there might be a compelling reason based on the national interest to read
"Legislature" more narrowly. But it is hard to see the case ex ante that
initiated Electoral College reform is more likely than legislatively-enacted
reform to create such uncertainty, except insofar as the Article II cloud now
hangs over the controversy before the Supreme Court finally resolves it.
Once that issue is resolved, assuming the Court approves initiated Electoral
College reform, initiated rule changes seem no more problematic to the
national interest than legislative ones.
To promote the interest of national uniformity of the rules for
choosing presidential electors, the framers could have adopted a uniform
rule for how states choose presidential electors; the Constitution does just
that in providing that members of the House of Representatives must be
chosen in popular elections. However, the Constitution's choice to leave it
to the states without even the possibility of congressional override of state
rules-as in Article I, section 4-shows a commitment not to national
uniformity but to federalism and diversity. Once we accept the principle of
state variation, it makes sense to allow those states that have adopted the
initiative process as a means of making all kinds of important public policy
decisions to be able to use it for Electoral College rule choice as well.
Thus, federalism supports the idea of initiated Electoral College reform." 7
115. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001). For my critique of this analysis, see Richard L. Hasen,
Book Review, A "Tincture of Justice: "Judge Posner's Failed Rehabilitation of Bush v. Gore, 80
TEXAS L. REv. 137 (2001).
116. On the evidence of the effect of the butterfly ballot, see Jonathan N. Wand et al., The
Butterfly Did It: The Aberrant Vote for Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida, 95 AM. POL.
SCi. REV. 793 (2001). On the legal question of the propriety of a revote in the Palm Beach
County case, see Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming US. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937, 991-93 (2005);
Steven J. Mulroy, Right Without a Remedy? The "Butterfly Ballot" Case and Court-Ordered
Federal Election "Revotes, " 10 GEO MASON L. REv. 215 (2001).
117. Cf Wilson, supra note 43, at 1388-98 (apply federalist approach to question of
constitutionality of state court review of legislatively-enacted congressional redistricting plans).
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I am afraid that this policy analysis too leaves us in something of a
muddle. There are reasonable policy arguments to be made on both sides
of this question, and none of these arguments appears to be a strong trump
of the others. There are sound arguments to be made on both sides, and a
Supreme Court decision either way is both plausible and defensible.
III. Avoiding Post-Presidential Litigation Over Article II
Challenges to Initiated Electoral College Reform
A. The Benefits of Pre-election Review of Article II Challenges
Part II demonstrates that the constitutional question surrounding
initiated Electoral College reform is difficult indeed. But sooner or later,
courts are going to have to resolve it. In this part, I argue that the question
should be resolved sooner rather than later.
I have elsewhere made the general case that courts should resolve
election law disputes as early as possible and use the doctrine of "laches" to
bar suits filed after an election that could have been filed earlier. 118 Pre-
election review sometimes provides the only way to give plaintiffs
effective relief;119 in contrast, post-election litigation, when the winner and
loser of the election will be determined by a court decision, injects courts
into the political thicket, threatening the legitimacy of both the courts and
the electoral process.1 E° Generally speaking, a rule encouraging pre-
election review and discouraging post-election review serves the public
interest best.
Nonetheless, courts sometimes have been reluctant to engage in pre-
election review, 12 1 perhaps hoping that some issues will resolve themselves
before the election. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Purcell v.
Gonzalez122 may have made things worse in this regard, by suggesting that
courts should avoid pre-election review where doing so can engender voter
confusion about the rules applicable to an upcoming election.
12 3
Regardless of the general merits of delaying a decision in election law
cases, courts should not delay decisions on the constitutionality of
118. Hasen, supra note 115, at 991-99.
119. Id. at 992.
120. Id. at 993.
121. Id. at 994-99.
122. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S.Ct. 5, 7 (2006).
123. For my criticism of Purcell on this point, see Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of
Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1, 36-37 (2007).
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initiatives that would change the means for allocating Electoral College
votes. As the 2000 Florida controversy showed, every court decision made
when the presidency of the United States may be on the line will be
scrutinized, and every judicial decision inconsistent with an observer's
political leanings may be characterized, rightly or wrongly, as a political
decision made by a biased judge. This danger is especially strong when it
comes to an issue such as the Article II issue, for which there is no easy
answer to the question of constitutionality.
For this reason, it is good news that had the California Electoral
College measure qualified for the November 2008 ballot, the California
Supreme Court could have relied upon precedent to entertain a pre-election
challenge to the measure's constitutionality. As a general rule, that court
will not entertain a pre-election challenge to an initiative raising the claim
that the "substantive provisions of the measure are unconstitutional. ' 24
However, when the challenge to the measure "rests instead on the
contention that the measure is not one that properly may be enacted by
initiative,"' 25 pre-election review "may be appropriate."' 126  Thus, in
American Federation of Labor v. Eu,127 the California Supreme Court
engaged in pre-election review to strike from the ballot as a violation of
Article V of the U.S. Constitution an initiative that would have directed the
California legislature to ratify a proposed balanced budget amendment to
the Constitution. 
128
Though the California court "may" find it appropriate to engage in
pre-election review, there is no guarantee it would do so.12 9  And other
states will not engage in substantive pre-election review under any
circumstances.130 Given the high costs of uncertainty in this area, one
would hope that state courts would exercise their discretion to find a way to
124. Independent Energy Producers v. McPherson, 38 Cal.4th 1020, 1029 (Cal. 2006).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. American Federation of Labor v. Eu, 36 Cal.3d 687, 695-97 (1984).
128. The measure also withheld legislative pay in the event the legislature failed to do so, and
directed the secretary of state to send a notice of ratification of the amendment to Congress if the
state legislature failed to ratify the amendment within forty days of its passage. See id. at 693-94.
129. Once the California Supreme Court makes a decision on whether or not the measure
violates Article II, the U.S. Supreme Court would appear to have jurisdiction over the case given
the federal question presented. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Standing also would appear
not to be a problem. See ASARCO, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 490 U.S. 605, 617-24 (1989).
130. See Wyoming National Abortion Rights League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 282, 286 (Wyo.
1994) (stating that a "majority of courts" in "sister jurisdictions" "have ruled that a controversy
over the constitutionality of an initiative is justiciable only after it has been enacted. These courts
clearly have held that any challenge to the constitutionality of an initiative does not present a
justiciable controversy under any circumstances.").
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engage in pre-election review of initiated Electoral College reform before
the fate of the presidency would be at stake in the litigation. The costs of
waiting to decide such a case until after such a measure passes greatly
outweigh the benefits of doing so.
B. The Benefits of a Constitutional Amendment to Delay
Implementation of Electoral College Reform Measures
Given uncertainty as to both the Article II question itself and the
willingness and ability of the courts to resolve such questions before a
presidential election, it is worth considering the merits of an amendment to
the U.S. Constitution that would bar changes in a state's rules for the
manner of choosing presidential electors from going into effect for at least
two years after passage of the change.
Unlike other Electoral College reform proposals that have clear
winners and losers, this amendment would be politically neutral, aimed at
preventing last minute uncertainty and partisan manipulation of the rules
for choosing each state's presidential electors. Ex ante, all relevant
political actors should favor reducing uncertainty, and all but the most
venal will favor eliminating partisan manipulation (and even the venal
might favor this proposal if they expect they could be on the wrong end of
such manipulation at some point in the future).
On the merits, the only downside I see to such a constitutional
amendment is that it might create a problem in the event of some kind of
major catastrophe, either within a state or nationally. That is, there may be
pressing emergency reasons for allowing immediate changes to the means
for choosing presidential electors. For this reason, the amendment should
be written to provide for an escape clause from the measure in the event of
such a catastrophe.
Consider the following language for a proposed Amendment:
No changes in any state's manner for choosing presidential electors
shall be effective until two years after such change is put in effect;
except that such changes shall be effective immediately upon a
declaration by a majority of Congress, the state's governor, or a 2/3
majority of the state legislature that a state or national catastrophe
requires the change to take effect immediately.
As with any constitutional amendment, such a measure is unlikely to
pass. It is hard to see what political incentive enough members of
Congress and state legislatures would have for carrying this good
government provision through the many hurdles of the amendment
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process.' Still, such a measure ought to pass, even if more significant
changes to our system for choosing the president remain necessary.
Conclusion
Whether or not the California Electoral College measure qualifies for
the ballot and is voted upon, courts eventually will have to confront the
question whether initiated Electoral College reform violates Article II of
the U.S. Constitution. With the National Popular Vote movement in full
swing, and other proposals for Electoral College reform floating around, it
is only a matter of time before some initiative changing the system
qualifies for a state ballot and stands a chance of passing.
Though the constitutional question is straightforward, the answer is
not: A strict textual view suggests that initiated reform is unconstitutional;
case law and policy arguments show the question is more uncertain.
Reasonable judges could reach opposite conclusions on the question.
Lacking any clear constitutional answers, there is a danger that judges
deciding the question will appear to the public to be swayed-consciously
or subconsciously-by political considerations. If the timing goes just
wrong, we could have another Bush v. Gore on our hands, with the
Supreme Court deciding yet another presidential election under contested
standards.
Because of these uncertainties, we should consider steps to avoid
another presidential election decided by the courts on these grounds. I have
proposed two steps. First, courts should be willing to engage in pre-
election review of Electoral College changes by initiative, even if the
courts do not otherwise engage in pre-election review of the
constitutionality of initiatives. Second, we should amend the Constitution
to put a delay on Electoral College reforms, to give time for courts to work
out the legal issues surrounding such reforms out of the context of an
immediate presidential election. Such a delay also minimizes the chances
that partisans (either in the legislature or through the initiative process)
could attempt to manipulate Electoral College rules for short-term political
gain.
For good or for bad, we appear to be stuck with both the Electoral
College for the foreseeable future and fairly widespread opposition to its
use. With that combination, it is only prudent to plan how avoid a
constitutional crisis over attempts to reform the system.
131. Consider, along similar lines, Congress's inaction over legislation to deal with national
catastrophes affecting the composition of Congress despite the major activity of the Continuity of
Government Commission. See http://www.continuityofgovemment.org.
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